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Abstract—This research intensively reviews and analyzes the 
strategic management of technology at Nokia Corporation. Using 
traditional narrative literature review and secondary sources, we 
reviewed and analyzed the historical transformation of Nokia’s 
core business, leadership strategies, business architecture, R&D 
policy, innovation strategy, product lunch, and smartphones 
recognition and demonstration. We identified various strategic 
gaps that the previous analytical studies seemingly have missed to 
identify and generalize. Therefore, we add to the literature a 
bundle of the lessons learned that chronologically explain how 
Nokia failed to create and sustain competitive advantages, 
particularly in the smartphone market.  We concluded that the 
problem at Nokia was not the lack of innovation, but rather, it 
was the lack of a precise technology forecasting, and 
misunderstanding that the needs in smartphone market were not 
just about demonstrating a mobile phone that makes calls, texts 
and connects to the web, but also the platform that operates all 
these functions together. Since Nokia’s brand name is recently 
back in the market through a newly licensed firm (HMD Global), 
we further discuss how likely the new Nokia’s smartphones will 
possibly compete and plausibly succeed in a very well-established 
market.   
I. INTRODUCTION 
Peter Drucker urges that the mission statement of any 
business is what defines the starting point of its strategies and 
plans [1]. The mission statement of Nokia was simple and 
straightforward; “Connecting People” [2, p. 10]. Nokia was 
focused on building its brand worldwide and achieving the 
credibility and market leading, which it once had. In 1994, the 
company successfully made the shift from a Finnish company 
to a global payer and became during the 1990s and early 2000s 
one of the world largest mobile phone firms in terms of 
volume, sales, market share and profit [3]. The introduction of 
its first smartphone N95 and the Symbian OS in Spring 2007 
has fostered the company leading position proved by the jump 
of its overall market share from 36% in 2006 to 38% in 2007 
[4]. In fact, Nokia made another dominance, particularly in 
smartphones industry with a market share of 70% in 2007 [3], 
leaving its competitor far behind. However, Nokia’s story of 
success started to fade away shortly after the introduction of the 
Apple iPhone in the third quarter of 2007 [4] and the 
breakthrough Human-Computer Interaction HCI, which set the 
standards for the user experience [3]. Although the overall 
market share reached 39% in 2008 [4] yet, all the financial 
figures of Nokia started to decline. For instance, net sales 
dropped by (-1%), operating profit by (-38%), and profit 
attributable to equity holders by (-45%) [5]. As a result, senior 
management made various strategic changes to take the 
company back into its leading position, or at least into a 
position that compensates or reduces the losses incurred since 
then. These strategic changes included the replacement of the 
CEO in 2010 to deploy new strategies. Nonetheless, Nokia’s 
deterioration was consistent, year after year [3, 4, 6, 7]. 
According to [3], Nokia’s market capitalization dropped from 
110 to 15 billion euros in 2012, which led the company to close 
various factories and R&D facilities, in addition to laying off 
many of its employees. Further, in September 2013, Microsoft 
officially announced the purchase of Nokia’s business unit of 
devices and services for 3.79 billion euros [3, 4] and patent 
license for 1.65 billion euros [8]. However, Microsoft as well 
couldn’t make any success in the space of smartphone market, 
and later in May 2016, the feature phone assets were sold to 
FIH Mobile Ltd., a subsidiary of Taiwanese firm Foxconn 
Technology and a newly-established firm HMD Global for 
$350 million [9, 10]. To this end, this research aims to answer 
the following questions;  
1. What are the strategic gaps at Nokia Corporation that 
led to its collapse, particularly in the smartphone 
market, despite it was one of the world’s great corporate 
success stories? 
2. How likely is the new home of Nokia phones, namely 
(HMD Global) would succeed in the smartphone 
market?   
In this research, we intend to present that the story of a 
significantly successful business may end up in a total fiasco, 
particularly when the strategies and plans deviate from the 
business mission and objectives. The business eventually fails 
regardless of how high its market share or how superior its 
leading position when the leadership fails to forecast the right 
time of the technology to market, and underestimates and/or 
misunderstand the total capabilities of the rivals, the market 
size and demand, the customer wants and needs, and the 
industry eco-system. Although the failure of a company such as 
Nokia was too painful and extremely expensive yet, it can be 
the perfect lessons learned to rethink the strategies for creating, 
achieving and sustain competitive advantages.    
II. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 Our interest is to acquire a wider and deeper understanding 
of why and how successful high-tech firms fail to create and 
sustain competitive advantages. We choose Nokia as a 
renowned story of success and a market leader for more than a 
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decade, but eventually suffered a persistent declination until it 
has completely failed to compete in the smartphone market. 
Therefore, we follow a historical posture in solving issues and 
interpreting ambiguities by collecting evidences that produce a 
comprehension of the processes, mechanisms, and outcomes. 
Our goal is to conduct a rigorous examination of the relevant 
data (desk-research or secondary sources) using traditional 
narrative literature review to summarizes the available body of 
literature and draws conclusions regarding the issue in 
question. This type of literature review is used to provide a 
comprehensive background for understanding the current 
knowledge of the problem and highlighting the implications of 
new research. We started gathering data from multiple sources 
by looking for information regarding the social, economic and 
industrial history of Nokia between the late of the 1970s and 
the present. The information was gathered focusing on Nokia’s 
history, including published academic research, magazine and 
journal articles, conferences preceding, as well as the firm’s 
official history and annual reports. Moreover, we considered 
the use of the available statistical data and logical reasoning to 
cope with the potential subjectivity of the qualitative analysis 
of the previous studies. The review comprises Nokia’s 
successive leaderships and strategic changes, business 
architecture, R&D policy, innovation strategy, products’ lunch, 
and smartphones’ recognition. In the final analysis, we 
employed multiple data sources to understand; (a) how Nokia 
has transformed its business model and greatly succeeded 
during the1990s and early 2000s, and (b) how its story of 
success continued until it started to decline in 2008. Moreover, 
our review and analysis extend to further our understanding of 
how likely the new Nokia’s smartphones by the newly licensed 
firm (HMD Global) possibly compete and plausibly succeed in 
a very well-established market. 
III. COMPANY OVERVIEW 
Nokia is Finnish multinational communications and IT 
corporation, which was founded in 1865 by Fredrik Idestam 
under the name of Nokia Katabolic [3, 13]. The company went 
through various changes over its history [6]. Its business model 
has been transformed from different industries; rubber, paper, 
and cable company to mobile handsets and mobile 
telecommunication infrastructure [7, 13]. The most prominent 
change happened between 1990 and 1996 when a fruitful 
transformation of the business model has been made to save the 
company from near bankruptcy and settled it on the path of 
becoming one of the world’s great corporate success stories for 
more than a decade and a half [6]. According to [14], the 
success of Nokia during that time was achieved based on 
various factors, namely; economic, cognitive, organizational, 
and institutional. Furthermore, Nokia’s dominance viewed as it 
was behavioral rather than structural [15]. In other words, it 
was based on factors such as culture and diversity, which 
articulated in corporate accountability, and development of 
shared values, management of human resources besides, the 
strength and unique characteristics of its senior management. In 
addition, the R&D within Nokia was a crucial factor that 
explains the development of new products and businesses [14]. 
However, Nokia’s success did not last longer than 2007, as the 
company went through a journey of a persistent declination of 
its financial performance as illustrated in figure 1 below [4].  
 
Figure 1 - Key data of Nokia mobile phones business unit – Source [4] 
According to [16], Nokia’s collapse from the top of the 
smartphone pyramid is due to three factors; (1) less technical 
capabilities compared with the rivals’ (e.g. Apple), (2) high 
level of complacency, and (3) failure of the leadership to see 
the upcoming disruption, particularly Apple’s iPhone. Another 
perspective views the factors to failure were; (1) the inability of 
the executives to grasp the market accurately, (2) deviation in 
the business tactics, and (3) lack of teamwork [8]. However, to 
identify and define the gaps in Nokia’s previous strategies that 
led to its disappearance from the mobile phone industry, 
multiple aspects will be discussed in the following sections.    
IV.  LEADERSHIP AND STRATEGIC CHANGES  
For around eleven years (1977-1988), Kari Kairamo was 
the CEO of Nokia. During his leadership, the company was 
transforming from a conglomerate to an internationally large 
multi-industry firm with an emphasis on telecommunication 
devices [3], mainly network equipment and digital switches for 
the telephone exchange [13]. This period has been considered 
as the era of growth, represented by the remarkable joint 
venture with Salora to develop the radio telephone company 
Mobira Oy in 1979, followed by the acquisition of ten large 
electronic and telecommunication companies [17]. As a result, 
Nokia became the largest electronics company in Scandinavia, 
particularly after the introduction of the Mobira Senator in 
1982, which was the first true mobile phone in box form with a 
network standard of 1G [13]. Later in 1984, Nokia introduced 
the Mobira Talkman, a portable car phone, which was featured 
to be recharged from the car’s cigarette lighter socket, followed 
by the introduction of Nokia Mobira Cityman brick-form 
mobile phones in 1987 [17]. Kairamo has always been cited as 
the driving force behind Nokia’s rise. This process of shifting 
and transforming the company to this type of industry was 
considered very successful, yet it did not complete due to his 
sudden death in 1988 [3]. However, Simo Vuoriletho 
succeeded him and led the company as a CEO till 1992. 
Vuoriletho changed Nokia’s strategy from an aggressive buyer 
to a seller of the basic industrial units [18]. This was considered 
not strategic since all Nokia’s businesses were divested [19]. 
This strategy left the company with internal and external 
conflicts, particularly with the two main shareholders at that 
time, the Union Bank and Kansallis Osake Pankki [3]. The 
company then failed to turn around among the unrestrained 
changes in the world between 1988 to 1991 [18].  
In 1992, Jorma Ollila has appointed as the CEO and since 
then, the era of modern Nokia has begun [3]. Ollila led the era 
of the digital GSM expansion and refocused Nokia by the 
strategic choice for mobile technology and wireless business 
[7, 19]. Despite the process of restructuring at Nokia started at 
the time when Vuoriletho was the CEO however, Ollila has 
continued this phase [18], particularly during 1994-1995, 
where the company witnessed a cultural change, namely the 
value-based leadership and management [3, 17]. Trust, loyalty, 
and commitment were the key values within Nokia under 
Ollila’s leadership, while employees enjoyed a freedom and 
took responsibility [3, 20]. Ollila in fact geared Nokia’s 
strategy towards; “internal product development based on 
concentration of intangible assets in know-how, skilled people 
and filling of critical patents, while operations were based on 
coherent and efficient process architecture, and strong customer 
orientation offering that was integrated with technical 
consumer-focused solutions” [3, p. 5]. Moreover, in 1994, 
Nokia 2110 DCT/GSM handset was brought to the market with 
(618,000) units sold [20], making the shift from a Finish 
company to a global payer [3]. Figure 2 illustrates the number 
of mobile phones produced and sold per year for Nokia and its 
rivals during 1990-2012, which reflects the upward streaming 
by Nokia starting in 1994. Ollila’s leadership led Nokia to be 
the number one mobile phone manufacturer in the world by 
1998 [17] and continued in the lead until he left in 2006 [4].  
 
Figure 2 - Mobile phones produced per year – Source [3] 
Olli-Pekka Kallasvuo who was Nokia’s CFO has succeeded 
Ollila in 2006. He implemented another cultural change by 
focusing on control due to the logistic crises and shifting the 
ownership from traditional Finnish investors to international 
investors, and to American mutual funds with short-term profit 
expectations as well as aggressive and active policies [3]. This 
strategic change was Kallasvuo’s vision since he was the CFO 
as he once said; “there is no way on earth this country 
[Finland] could own Nokia. Even if every penny of every 
investor in Finland was put into Nokia stock, the Finnish could 
hold perhaps 25 percent of the company. So, we had to go to 
the biggest capital market in the world and really become a 
U.S. company in that respect” [21, p. 12]. With his vision and 
background, Kallasvuo was considered the right CEO to deal 
with the financial markets and production optimization, but he 
was not a fit in managing the market changes and the 
innovation disruption [22]. This gap has reflected on his vision 
towards the smartphones disruption, which obviously caused 
the downward spiral in the overall Nokia’s market share. In 
fact, Nokia’s market share fell from 39% in 2009 to 28% by the 
end of 2010 [2] (see figures 1&2). Apparently, this was the 
reason that led to replacing Kallasvuo with Stephen Elop in 
2010, who was the first CEO from outside Nokia and was 
expected due to his capabilities as the former head of Microsoft 
business division to be the best fit to turn around Nokia [3]. 
Elop reformed the team of the executive board management 
and the company structure, splitting devices and services 
business units into separate smart devices and mobile phones 
units [4]. However, the famous “Burning Platform” memo and 
the metaphor he used to compare the company with the burning 
oil platform considered a controversial choice of the statement 
[4]. Elop by that expressed his lack of trust in the company’s 
core products, particularly the Symbian, and MeeGo platforms, 
and therefore, he developed a strategic partnership with 
Microsoft to adopt Windows Mobile OS instead [2, 3]. Elop’s 
strategic intent was to gain a quick lead in the smartphone 
market and retain Nokia’s leading position in the low-end 
mobile phones. Obviously, Elop as well has failed to 
understand the users’ wants and needs in term of the platform 
that operates the products. Microsoft mobile OS was not the 
right fit to compete with Apple’s iOS and Google Android. In 
fact, this strategy led the stock price of Nokia to be dropped by 
62%, the mobile phone market share dropped by 50%, the 
smartphone market share dropped from 33% to 3%, and the 
cumulative loss reached 4.9 billion euros [24]. The reflection of 
Elop’s strategies can be clearly seen in the downward 
performance as depicted in figure 3 below.  
 
Figure 3 - Elop’s strategy – Source [23] 
V. LOGISTIC AND BUSINESS ARCHITECTURE 
To control the logistics and cope with the increasing 
demand on mobile phones, Nokia developed a strategy of 
market segmentation based on the distinction among the 
technologies, high-end and low-end markets, and entertainment 
and mobile services [3]. This strategy, in fact, has augmented 
the layers of the management (over 300 VPs and Senior VPs 
globally) and built a complicated organizational structure that 
has caused considerable delays in the decision-making 
processes [25]. With this excessive organizational complexity 
and bureaucracy, decisions regarding each product were taking 
months if not years to be made. Therefore, the responsiveness 
to the rapid-changing mobile market has been significantly 
affected [26]. According to [27], the greatest barriers to growth 
are often caused by a dynamic called the “Growth Paradox”, 
which is the buildups of complexity and bureaucracy. This 
paradox caused for the case of Nokia; “the loss of the internal 
metabolism, speed, self-awareness, sense of urgency, and 
general bloat of staff instead of any outside factors they may 
have missed” [27, p. 2].    
VI. R&D STRATEGY  
The major focus of the R&D within Nokia was on product 
development, while the only minor portion was on basic 
research [3]. During the 1990s, the R&D efforts were mostly 
focused on the basic development of both mobile phones and 
mobile data communications, however, the focus on product 
development was incremental rather than radical [21]. Nokia 
conducted most of the R&D in-house (i.e. Nokia Research 
Centre NRC), as well as in 44 international research centers 
located in 12 countries [3, 21]. The NRC was closely 
associated with schools in Finland as part of the open 
innovation policy, represented by partnerships with the 
Tampere University of Technology as the core partner besides, 
Aalto and Oulu Universities [3]. In addition to partnerships 
with top American schools such as MIT and Stanford as well as 
Chinese schools such as BUPT and Tsinghua [3]. Nokia spent a 
huge sum of its revenues and 10% of its sales on R&D [28, 29]. 
The majority of the NRC funding sourced from the business 
divisions and researchers were asked to explain what they were 
doing by getting buy-in from the technology users [21]. 
According to the Bernstein Research [30], Nokia spent around 
$3.9 billion in 2010 on developing its mobile phones, which is 
almost three times the average of its rivals spending, while 
third of the total spending on R&D for the same year went to 
the development of Symbian OS. Figure 4 below explains 
Nokia’s spending on R&D from 1990-2012.  
 
Figure 4 – Nokia’s R&D spending in euros – Adopted from [3] 
Nokia’s spending on R&D has produced a remarkable list 
of innovations that consist of a variety of products ranging 
from network components to handset features, digital camera 
and software solutions [3]. Figure 5 shows the upward 
streaming of Nokia’s number of patents filed during 1990-
2013, making the highest number of patents in 2008. 
Importantly, prior to 2008, Nokia has been collaborating much 
more through joint R&D, outsourcing, and standardization 
consortia, but has at the same time managed to develop and 
maintain a strong brand name and corporate identity [31]. At 
the end of 2006, 31% of the employees worked in R&D, 
although largely in product development [24].  
 
Figure 5 - Number of Patents at Nokia (1990-2013) – Adopted from [3] 
VII. INNOVATION STRATEGY 
Nokia is a technology-intensive firm therefore, it has 
massively invested to the R&D as discussed before. This huge 
investment led to release dozens of mobile devices every year 
to meet the dynamic and rapid changing in the consumers’ 
preferences and desires for additional and more features and 
settings, which required rigorous input and innovation [4]. 
Many people think that Nokia’s failure is rooted in the lack of 
innovation however, this company had a great portfolio of 
innovations and patents, explained in figure 5. For example, in 
2002, Nokia demonstrated a prototype of 3D user interface, 
which means five years before its rivals brought it to the 
market [25], while in 2004, it has demonstrated a smartphone 
prototype with a large touch screen, or in other words, three 
years before the Apple iPhone was launched. Furthermore, the 
leadership at Nokia was mindful of having a well-defined 
advanced technology and competitive advantages based on 
high-tech products [3]. When the leadership team reflected on 
Nokia’s innovation record in the 1990s, it was clear that 
Nokia’s engineers had excelled at the technological innovations 
needed to improve the existing product categories [21, p. 15]. 
The concept of the open innovation has been early and 
effectively adopted [3, 31] as the company embedded its efforts 
in both local and international innovation networks [31]. 
During 1997-2002, (i.e. the beginning of the third generation 
(3G) of mobile telecommunications), or in other words, the 
advent of the Universal Mobile Telecommunications Service 
UMTS, Nokia was able to develop 48 agreements of strategic 
alliance, as 25 of which were joint development agreements, 16 
co-production contracts, 6 joint ventures and one 
standardization consortium [31]. Furthermore, the company 
adopted an ambidextrous approach to ensure both exploitation 
predominant and existing technologies as a significant and 
ideally a cost-effective basis with high volumes in one hand, 
and exploration by establishing a venturing fund on the other 
hand [3]. In addition, Nokia adopted an acquisition strategy 
that led to acquiring more than 50 companies and/or businesses 
during 1997-2013 [32]. These acquisitions included advanced 
technologies (e.g. Sega.com, Intellisync Corporation), product 
concepts (e.g. MetaCarta), access to content (e.g. music: 
Loudeye Corporation; maps: Navteq). However, this strategy 
was not very successful since many ideas, projects, and plans, 
with few exceptions, did not materialize [3].  
VIII. PRODUCT SEGMENTATION  
One explanation how Nokia succeeded in becoming the 
choice for the majority of the users is the clear identification of 
the users’ segmentation and the development of distinctive 
value propositions to meet each segment’s wants and needs, 
which was a strategy that has been adopted since the era of 
Nokia’s Talkman and Cityman [33]. This strategy was 
developed to cope with the market expansion, portability, 
design, style, and services as shown in figure 6, which 
illustrates the segmentation based on three generations; 
technology G1, lifestyle G2, and functionality G3 [34]. Nokia 
launched a variety of mobile phones devices that have been 
innovated to meet the strategy for market segmentation. In 
2007 and 2008, a new segmentation structure was developed to 
comprise 12 user categories strategized along two dimensions; 
higher involvement-lower involvement, and rational-
aspirational [35].  
Table 1 in Appendix A lists all the feature phones series 
and smartphones that Nokia has developed and released. This 
outstanding list proves how various and innovative products 
Nokia has delivered to the world [36]. Importantly, Nokia 
released 406 different models during 1995-2013, making the 
highest number in 2008 by releasing 47 different models, 
followed by 44 in 2009, 28 in 2010, 36 in 2011, 30 in 2012, 
and 25 in 2013. However, Nokia’s strategy represented by 
launching so many products every year and the development of 
this type of detailed segmentation have led to an 
overabundance of product-market combinations, which has 
been criticized as a lack of product focus, and a main reason 
why Nokia couldn’t develop and release the one product that 
would compete with its rivals’ [3]. 
IX. RECOGNITION OF SMARTPHONES 
The question that often been asked is what makes a 
smartphone is a smartphone? However, a smartphone is a 
mobile phone that offers more advanced computing ability and 
connectivity than a contemporary basic feature phone [37]. In 
other words, a smartphone is a handheld device that integrates 
mobile phone capabilities with the more common features of a 
handheld computer or PDA [38]. A smartphone allows users to 
store information, send and receive e-mails, install programs, 
socialize and browse online, and along with using a mobile 
phone in one device [39]. We will intensively discuss Nokia’s 
recognition and demonstration of smartphones (both hardware 
and software) based on two stages. The early stage, or the stage 
of Nokia’s dominance, which started in the early 2003 and 
lasted until early 2008, and the disruption stage, or the stage of 
deterioration, which started in early 2008 and lasted until when 
Nokia sold its mobile devices and services business in early 
2014.   
1) Early Stage – Nokia’s Dominance 
Since an early stage, Nokia strongly acknowledged that the 
development of smartphones and the software platforms were 
the new path for mobile communications industry [4]. In 2003 
Nokia released its first smartphone based on Symbian OS v7.0 
kernel software, the Nokia 6600, although its screen was a TFT 
“non-touch” [3]. Moreover, in 2004 the company introduced 
Nokia 7710 (feature-packed multimedia smartphone with pen 
input and handwriting recognition), as the first TFT resistive 
touchscreen, Symbian OS powered smartphone, which might 
be defined as the early prototype of today’s smartphones [40] 
as shown in figure 7. However, according to various 
technological defects, this smartphone was not made 
commercially available in the market [4]. According to [42], in 
2005, Nokia brought together some researchers from NRC and 
academia to brainstorm the future of sensor networks. Within 
this brainstorming, the researchers discussed how the phone 
could serve as a user interface and an entry for existing sensor 
networks [42]. In fact, the category of smartphones as part of 
the Nokia’s strategy regarding mobile phone business unit was 
officially announced in the 2005 annual report due to the 
adaptation of various features and rapid evolvement of mobile 
devices [43]. 
 
Figure 6 - Nokia mobile phones development – Adopted from [35] 
 
 
Figure 6 - Nokia 7710 smartphone prototype in 2004 – Source [41] 
The emergence of mobile phones new features, which 
meant that the new generation of the mobile phones would be 
capable of running computer’s applications such as email, web 
browsing and enterprise software in addition to the capabilities 
of having built-in features such as music players, video 
recorders, mobile TV and other multimedia features [4]. In 
2006, Nokia released 35 mobile phones [3] included the release 
of the traditional products; the 4-digit series, as well as the 
release of both N and E-series [44]. During the same year, the 
market trends have marked the shift in Nokia’s strategy to 
diversify the activities of the company to further the focus on 
consumer internet services, network solutions and the increase 
in professional and enterprise services [4]. In fact, 2006 
considered as a milestone for Nokia’s development in Asia, 
particularly in China, where the annual sales and exports in this 
country reached more than 10 billion euros, marking China as 
the largest market for Nokia globally [8].  
The release of Nokia’s N-series (i.e. Nokia smartphones), 
enabled the users to send and receive emails over multiple 
networks, and enjoy the Universal Plug and Play, mobile TV, 
music, photo sharing, and games, have all reflected the 
convergence in the market strategies and product developments 
[3]. In Spring 2007, Nokia released N95 (see figure 8) as an 
early smartphone [46], which was equipped with an 
accelerometer and GPS (i.e. Nokia maps) [3, 46]. The N95 was 
a flagship smartphone that was developed to beat its rivals’ [4]. 
It was also a complete multimedia computer with a list of 
functionalities that have never integrated before into a single, 
pocket-sized device [47]. This version of Nokia’s smartphones 
had a high-end rear and front-end camera for video calls, play 
audio and video and included business applications [3]. 
However, its operating system “Symbian” and Java Micro 
Edition (JME) virtual machine rather limiting since they both 
have been developed to use a limited portion of the memory 
and computational resources [46]. Two months later, Nokia 
global market share has jumped from 33% to 36%, while the 
smartphone market share reached around 70% [3]. A year later, 
Nokia announced that more than 7 million units of this model 




Figure 7 - Nokia 95 - Source [45] 
2) Disruption Stage – Nokia’s Deterioration 
In June 2007, Apple launched its first iPhone 3G [3, 4], to 
make obvious differences in the technical specifications 
compared with Nokia N95’s [13]. The N95’s features such as 
the small and non-touchscreen, complicated interface, slow 
Symbian OS, non-user-friendly app customization compared to 
those of the iPhone have proved that the iPhone outperformed 
[36]. Although the iPhone was criticized for the lack of 3G 
support and poor camera quality, however, its big touchscreen 
and the iOS platform have caught the users’ imagination, and 
therefore, it thoroughly shortened the time to compete and 
surpass [47]. Obviously, Nokia failed to recognize that the 
users were no longer interested in power, but instead in the ease 
of use [48]. However, by Q4 of 2007, Nokia’s market share 
regarding smartphones was still the largest compared to Apple 
and other major players as shown in figure 9 below [49].   
 
Figure 8 – Q4, 2007 Smartphones Market - Adopted from [49] 
The threat of Apple’s iPhone and the release of the first 
Google’s Android version 1.0 in 2008 forced Nokia to respond 
strategically by introducing Nokia 5800 Xpress Music with 
Symbian OS and first touchscreen [13, 25]. Although around 8 
million units of this model were sold [50] yet, this smartphone 
did not manage to compete with the quality of the iPhone, since 
it was designed based on Series 60 5th Edition, which was later 
criticized for its user interface as it was not optimized for a 
touchscreen and was nowhere comparable to Apple’s iPhone 
[25]. As a result of this new failure, Nokia’s profit by Q3 of 
2008 dropped by 30% and sales by 3.1% [13]. On the contrary, 
iPhone’s sales increased steeply and quickly by around 330 % 
during the same period [50]. However, Nokia continued to 
lunch new smartphones (e.g. N97 in 2009), which was 
designed to take over the iPhone, but according to one of 
Nokia’s top managers, this smartphone was a total fiasco [16]. 
Taking into the consideration that Nokia did not penetrate in 
the North American market, even after the competition became 
fierce with Apple [3]. Yet, Nokia’s battle continued, and hence, 
an “iPhone Killer” and a flagship N8 powered by the improved 
Symbian^3 [4] with AMOLED capacitive touchscreen [51] 
was introduced in Spring 2010. Nonetheless, 2010 witnessed 
the introduction of two remarkable smartphones; iPhone 4 and 
Samsung Galaxy S1[25]. In fact, the introduction of these 
smartphones caused Nokia’s smartphones market share to 
decline from 38% in 2009 to 27.6% by the end of 2010 [2, 52, 
53] as shown in figure 10, while the mobile devices market 
share as well has dropped from 34% in 2009 to 32% in 2010 
[4]. Nokia persistently struggled to release a smartphone that 
either matches its rivals’ high-end smartphones (e.g. Apple, 
Samsung, HTC) or competes with much cheaper manufacturers 
such as ZTE or Huawei [52].  
In June 2011, Nokia introduced a new smartphone, N9 with 
an AMOLED capacitive touchscreen and powered by MeeGo 
1.2 [54, 55]. Yet, the operating system of this smartphone was 
a hybrid that is mainly built on Harmattan, the legacy Maemo 6 
code base that Nokia closed when it committed to MeeGo 1.2. 
This means that the distinction will be little more than an 
implementation detail as far as users and application developers 
are concerned [56]. In fact, N9 was developed to be the only 
Nokia’s MeeGo smartphone [25, 57]. However, in October 
2011, Nokia launched Lumia 800 and Lumia 710 to be 
powered for the first time by Microsoft Windows Phone 7.5 
Mango [25, 57]. Nevertheless, these Lumia smartphones did 
not make any success, but instead, they have incurred Nokia 
more losses regarding its smartphone market share, which 
dropped to 12.2% by the end of 2011 [53]. Not surprisingly, 
net sales dropped from 38.66 billion euros by the end of 2011 
to 30.80 by the end of 2012 [58], while the market share fell 
extremely to (2.9%)  as shown in figure 10.  
 
Figure 9 - Nokia’s market share, Q1,2007 - Q2, 2013 - Reproduced from [53] 
Later in 2012, Nokia released Lumia 920 [59], which is 
powered by Microsoft Windows Phone 8, and became one of 
the best-selling smartphones in many countries as well as at 
Amazon.com [25]. Nonetheless, there is a debate about the 
competitiveness of this model. In one hand, some reviewers 
viewed this model as a high-quality build, good camera 
features, and a top-notch suite of integrated apps [13]. In fact, 
Lumia 920 helped Nokia to become profitable during Q4 of 
2012 (+ 202 million euros) after six consecutive quarters of 
huge losses [60]. It also helped to make a very slight increase 
of the smartphone market share in Q2 of 2013 (see figure 10) 
[53]. On the other hand, users of this smartphone lost the 
interest due to many factors such as the lack of third-party 
applications support, the device weight and dimensions, 
overheating issue, battery life when using GPS or Maps, blurry 
captured images, slow picture taking, and difficulty to transfer 
video to YouTube, in addition to a relatively high price for 
such specifications [61]. In a short, Lumia 920 failed to 
compete with the Apple’s iPhone and Samsung’s Galaxy [13]. 
Therefore, Nokia’s sales by the end of 2013 dropped to more 
than half of its sales in 2012, making only 12.7 billion euros 
[58], and the company started to make losses again during the 
entire 2013 [60]. In the 2013 annual report, Nokia justified the 
declination in smartphone’s net sales primarily to lower 
volumes, which affected by the competitive industry dynamics 
including the strong momentum of competing for smartphone 
platforms, in addition to the transitioning portfolio from 
Symbian products to Lumia products [62].  
X. SMARTPHONE’S OPERATING SYSTEMS  
The era of smartphones goes beyond just the product 
innovation to significantly comprise the innovations of the 
operating systems OS that operating them [63]. In other words, 
to integrate both hardware and software in the making of one 
successful product. Originally, Nokia’s phones were powered 
by Nokia’s OS, which lasted until 1998 when the company 
started the Symbian initiative; a platform launched by Psion, a 
PDA-provider as an alternative to its branded OS [3]. Nokia 
has extensively exploited two options; first, to continue the 
development of its Symbian OS, and second, to develop a new 
MeeGo capability before turning to Windows Phone OS in 
2011 [4]. In this chapter, we will review the smartphones’ 
operating systems at Nokia; Symbian, MeeGo and Windows 
Phones.  
1) Symbian OS 
As discussed before, Nokia approached the smartphones’ 
market since 2003 by introducing the Nokia 6600, but its N95 
in 2007 was considered as the first real smartphone, powered 
by Symbian OS and Java Micro Edition (JME), as both were 
developed to use limited portion of the memory and 
computational resources [46]. However, Nokia’s dominance of 
the market till the end of 2007 was principally due to the 
Symbian OS [3]. As listed in table 1 in Appendix A, most of 
Nokia’s phones series (i.e. both featured phones and some 
smartphone) were developed to be powered by Symbian OS. 
Although the core strengths of the Symbian powered devices 
characterized in its technological dominance, such as better 
camera, Bluetooth, 3G connectivity, and GPS features (Nokia’s 
map) however, they did not offer such exciting user interface as 
Apple’s iOS and Google’s Android have had [4]. Furthermore, 
although Apple’s iOS and the Linux based Android open 
platform became major threats to Nokia’s Symbian since 2007 
[3] yet, the Symbian was the most popular smartphone OS on a 
worldwide level until the end of 2010 [64]. According to [65], 
the Symbian OS made a market share of (32.3%) by Q4, 2010, 
followed by Android (30.5%) and Apple iOS came third with a 
global market share of (15.8%) as shown in figure 11 below.  
 
Figure 10 – Smartphones’ OSs (Q4, 2010)  -  Reproduced from [65] 
However, the Symbian OS failed in creating an ecosystem 
and providing enough applications for its users, since its 
developers did not understand that the basic functions were not 
enough in the growing smartphone market, adding to that the 
technical problems with the operating system, which was 
slowed down the developers of the applications [2, 3, 4, 66]. 
The problem behind the failure of the Symbian OS urged to 
be the fragmentation of the software architecture [4]. In 
addition, the Symbian in the early stage was written to run on 
very low power CPUs, which led to even less processing power 
than for instance, the Linux OS or iOS in achieving similar 
tasks [64]. The Symbian has not been developed to support 
several devices or integrate different features at the same time, 
which led to creating complicated issues for the whole Nokia’s 
software development. According to [4], “the biggest 
difference between Symbian and the most popular operating 
systems today, such as Android or iOS, was that the device 
development was driving the platform development-the 
product-specific software was in many cases only compatible 
with that certain device” [4, p. 33]. Furthermore, according to 
[67, 68] the Symbian failed due other reasons such as; outdated 
interface, lack of applications, perpetual hanging, and outdated 
browser. However, in February 2011, the Symbian era and its 
development have come to an end, particularly when Nokia 
announced the partnership with Microsoft in making Windows 
Phone as the smartphones’ primary platform [3, 4, 25]. Yet, 
Nokia continued to ship devices based on Symbian [69] until 
the last Symbian device has been shipped in Summer 2013 [4].   
2) MeeGo OS 
Under the name of Open Source Software Operations, the 
MeeGo development team was formulated and started in 2005 
to explore alternatives for the Symbian OS [4], which was 
renamed in 2007 as the Maemo team [3]. The Linux-based, 
open-source software platform, was announced in 2010 by 
merging the Maemo team (renamed again in 2010 to be the 
MeeGo team [3]) with Intel’s Moblin to jointly create the 
MeeGo OS [3, 4]. According to 2011 annual report, the MeeGo 
was expected to be a winning platform in the smartphone 
market and a direct competitor to Apple’s iOS and Google’s 
Android [57]. While Nokia N9 was launched successfully to 
the market to be powered by the MeeGo OS for the first time as 
a Nokia’s smartphone [57], which was considered as a peak of 
MeeGo development [4] however, the eco-system around the 
MeeGo platform never went beyond Nokia and Intel [3]. In 
other words, the platform has not been supported, neither by 
the hardware providers, nor the operators. The announcement 
of Nokia’s new strategy in February 2011 and decision made to 
choose Microsoft Windows Phone as the new operating system 
for Nokia’s smartphones turned the MeeGo to be a project of 
an open source mobile operating system, which in the long 
term, would be used for market research on next-generation 
devices, platforms, and user experiences [70]. Anyway, the 
strategic partnership with Microsoft has ended Nokia’s 
involvement in the MeeGo OS [3, 4, 25]. As mentioned before, 
Nokia released only one MeeGo smartphone (i.e. N9) as an 
outcome of two years of the platform development [70]. In fact, 
Elop has made a clear decision that  there is no returning to 
MeeGo, even if N9 significantly succeeded [71]. Moreover, 
two aspects should be taken into the consideration; first, Nokia 
did not launch the N9 in the United States [72, 73], which 
means that there was no chance for the MeeGo to be tested and 
used in the North American market, and second, Nokia did not 
release the market share that the MeeGo has made, and there is 
no clear information even about how many units have been 
sold worldwide. Moreover, the development of the MeeGo has 
been in parallel with the development of the Symbian, which 
considered a highly resource consuming, especially that these 
two operating systems were not the only platforms that Nokia’s 
R&D was investigating [4]. For that, some urged that the 
“Burning Platform” metaphor of Elop was not incorrect [3]. 
3) Windows Phone OS 
In February 2011, Nokia announced a partnership with 
Microsoft to bring together the respective corresponding assets 
and expertise of both parties to build a new global mobile 
ecosystem for smartphones [57]. This partnership, under which 
Nokia adopted and licensed Windows Phone from Microsoft as 
the primary platform [69]. However, at the time when this 
strategic partnership was announced, the market share of 
Windows Phone OS was only 2.6%, whereas Symbian’s was 
27.7%, and the Android’s was 36.4% as shown in figure 12. 
These apparent variances in the platforms market shares have 
created a debate around Nokia’s decision to abandon the 
Symbian OS and to favor Windows phone OS on Android. In 
one hand, many technologists urged that the steady pace 
whereby Nokia develops new hardware would have made 
perfect sense to have chosen Android [74], or it might have 
leveraged the investment on the Symbian OS. Yet, Nokia’s 
CEO at that time justified the decision to choose Windows 
Phone OS since Nokia would have been a late entrant into the 
Android space, while many strong rivals were already in there 
[75]. Elop added that his leadership was concerned that a one 
hardware manufacturer (implicitly meant Samsung) could have 
dominated Android OS due to its resources and vertical 
integration.  
 
Figure 11 - Smartphones’ OSs (Q1, 2011)  -  Reproduced from [65] 
On the other hand, others viewed the alliance with 
Microsoft as a strategy to penetrate the US and North 
American market since this market is a core for Windows [3] 
and was important but untapped for Nokia. Yet, the Nokia 
Lumia came about and the OVI store was integrated with the 
Windows Phone Store and since then Nokia has collapsed [3]. 
Indeed, Nokia Lumia by all its models proved that the decision 
to switch to Windows Phone OS was a misguided strategic 
decision, which illustrated by the losses Nokia has incurred 
since Q1, 2011 as shown in figure 13 below [58]. The failure in 
nailing the smartphones’ market based on the strategic 
partnership with Microsoft is in fact associated with the failure 
of the Windows Phone OS itself. From figures 11 and 12 
above, the market share of Windows phone OS has never 
exceeded (3.6%) at best. In fact, this share continued to drop 
quarter by quarter until it was (0%) market share by Q1, 2016. 
According to [76], there were several reasons why Microsoft's 
Mobile Business failed to take off, especially that Microsoft 
was too late to the game, and the emerging market didn’t 
respond the way Microsoft designed, planned and expected. 
 
Figure 12 - Nokia's net profit/loss from 2009 to 2014 – Source [58] 
XI.   THE NEW NOKIA (2014-PRESENT)   
By April 2014, Nokia has completely closed the business of 
the mobile devices and services after it has been substantially 
sold to Microsoft [77, 78]. This deal was originally announced 
in September 2013, and it has included license patents to 
Microsoft. Nokia considered the year 2014 as a new 
transformation and a start of various essential changes, 
particularly the appointment of Rajeev Suri as the President 
and CEO, in addition to the allocation of five billion euros as a 
capital structure optimization program [78]. The company has 
newly emerged from the transaction with a firm financial 
footing and three strong businesses; Nokia Networks, HERE 
and Nokia Technologies [77, 78]. Each of these businesses is a 
leader in its respective field, proved by the global presence of 
the R&D facilities in Europe, North America, and Asia, while 
the sales started to take over in 140 countries [78]. Nokia in 
fact started to make profits in Q2, 2014 [60], although it has 
decreased in the subsequent quarters yet, this change has been 
considered a major positive transformation resulted from the 
new leadership and converged strategies. According to [77], the 
reflection of this transformation can also be seen in the 
company financial performance (net sales, gross profit, 
dividend per share, and net cash in million euros) during 2014, 
2015 and 2016 [79]. Furthermore, as a part of the new 
transformation and strategies, Nokia announced a strategy to 
create new businesses and licensing opportunities in the 
consumer eco-system [77]. Indeed, in May 2016, a strategic 
brand and intellectual property licensing agreement were 
signed to grant HMD Global Oy (HMD), a newly-established 
Finnish private venture based in Helsinki, Finland an exclusive 
global license to create Nokia branded mobile phones (both 
feature phones and smartphones) and tablets for the next ten 
years [11, 12]. The agreement entered into effect on December 
1st, 2016, allowing HMD to begin the operations as the new 
home of Nokia phones [77]. HMD and FIH Mobile Ltd., a 
subsidiary of Taiwanese firm Foxconn Technology have 
bought the feature phone assets from Microsoft for $350 
million euros [9, 10]. The deal included brands, software and 
services, customer contracts and supply agreements as well as 
the transfer of 4,500 employees [80]. Nokia also announced 
that the remainder of Microsoft feature phone business assets, 
including manufacturing, sales, and distribution, would be 
acquired by FIH Mobile Ltd, while Nokia Technologies and 
HMD have signed an agreement with FIH to establish a 
collaboration framework to support the building of a global 
business for Nokia-branded mobile phones and tablets [12]. 
This agreement gave HMD Global full operational control 
of sales, marketing, and distribution of Nokia-branded mobile 
phones and tablets, with exclusive access to a prominent global 
sales and distribution network to be acquired from Microsoft 
by FIH, access to FIH world-leading device manufacturing, 
supply chain and engineering capabilities, and to its growing 
suite of proprietary mobile technologies and components [12]. 
However, in order for HMD to complete its portfolio of Nokia 
branding rights, the company has conditionally agreed to 
acquire the rights to use the trademark of Nokia on feature 
phones until 2024 from Microsoft, and to design rights relating 
to Microsoft feature phone business, where these agreements 
will make HMD the sole global licensee for all types of Nokia 
branded mobile phones and tablets [11]. Importantly to 
mention that Nokia is not an investor in HMD Global, but it 
has a representation on its board and will receive a royalty on 
every Nokia branded device that HMD Global makes and sells 
[77, 81, 82].  
XII. NOKIA PHONES ARE BACK  
On December 1st, 2016, HMD has officially announced its 
entry to the market to bring Nokia-branded phones [83]. A 
week later, HMD announced the introduction of its first mobile 
phone; Nokia 150 and Nokia 150 Dual SIM phones, and they 
would be officially available in the Market by January 2017 
[84]. Later in February of the same year, the very famous 
Nokia 3310 (new look) has been announced and then released 
in May at a price of 49 euros [85]. However, no clear 
information available about how many units have been sold 
from both Nokia 150, and Nokia 3310 to date, and how was the 
impact of these new versions on the market of the feature 
phones. Furthermore, in January 2017, HMD launched its first 
Android-based smartphone (Nokia 6) into China, explaining 
that the Chinese market was selected preliminary to reflect the 
company’s desire in meeting the real world needs of consumers 
in different markets around the globe [86, 87]. HMD viewed 
the Chinese market as the best option based on the increasing 
number of the users with over 552 million in 2016 and 
expected to grow to more than 593 million by 2017 [87]. This 
was considered an important strategic decision since premium 
design and quality are highly valued by Chinese consumers 
[87]. However, during the Mobile World Congress, which held 
in Barcelona in February 2017, HMD announced a new era for 
Nokia smartphones by launching Nokia 6 globally [88]. 
Perhaps, it was the 100,000 units sold of this smartphone in one 
minute in a flash sale in China for approximately $250 per unit 
[89, 90] what really encouraged HMD to launch this model 
globally. According to [91], “While we are not sure how many 
units actually were available, it is not entirely surprising given 
that the handset had received over a million registrations for its 
first flash sale”. During the same event, HMD unveiled that a 
new generation of Nokia smartphones would be released; 
Nokia 5 and Nokia 3. This announcement remarked the new 
standard in design, quality, and user experience throughout the 
range. Nokia 5 would be retailed at an average global retail 
price of 189 euros [92] while Nokia 3 for 139 euros [93]. In 
Appendix B, Nokia 5 and Nokia 3 are shown in figures 15 and 
16 and briefly described in tables 2 and 3 respectively. The new 
range of Nokia smartphones all run Android™ Nougat 
and offer a pure, secure and up to date experience and will all 
feature Google Assistant. [88].  
It is early to review and analyze the users’ desirability 
based on the performance of these smartphones and to judge 
whether they would compete strongly although they are 
operated by Android and would be sold for highly competitive 
prices. However, the smartphones industry is a very well-
established and has a very advanced technology. The players in 
this industry (e.g. Apple, Samsung, Huawei, HTC, etc.) are 
already having powerful brands, which have been built 
according to their high-quality and high reliability products for 
long period of time. Therefore, creating and sustaining 
competitive advantages will require not only financial 
capabilities and R&D strategies, but also strong brand names, 
and customer base, experience and loyalty. Nonetheless, 
Nokia’s brand name is currently having no market share (see 
figure 14), but it has a powerful brand name as well as a long 
and outstanding history in the mobile phone industry regardless 
of the failure in nailing the smartphone market caused by the 
strategic gaps discussed in this research.  
 
Figure 13 – Smartphones’ market shares, Q4, 2009 to Q2, 2017 - Source [94] 
Furthermore, the smartphone market is a very price 
sensitive with customers seek out the best value for money. 
HMD strategy in setting low prices is reflecting a high 
consideration of this critical factor. Generally, the smartphones 
market is highly competitive as the number of options is 
considered significant, which is creating a high power for the 
smartphones’ users to compare, select and eventually make 
decisions regarding which brand they select to meet their 
wants, needs, desires, and budget. According to [95], the users 
of products such as smartphones in fact, make their decisions 
regarding the brand based on many factors that involve not 
only how appealing is the product, but also on factors that drive 
their emotions and engage them for long time as loyal 
customers, particularly the drivers of the product and brand 
experiences [95].  
XIII. CONCLUSION  
It is obvious that Nokia’s story of success has negatively 
impacted its later strategies and performance since success 
adversely developed a high level of complacency, that is 
clearly seen in underestimating the rivals’ capabilities. 
However, we have concluded that Nokia did not miss the 
opportunity of the smartphones as it was fully aware of its 
disruption. The huge investments in R&D, the variety of 
inventions and innovations, and the market research and 
performance are all proving that the company was very well 
prepared for this disruption. Indeed, the problem at Nokia was 
not the lack of innovation, but rather, it was the lack of 
forecasting the right time to market. In addition, Nokia during 
the time when smartphones became a necessity in people’s 
lives, has misunderstood that the market needs were not just 
about a mobile phone that makes calls, texts and connects to 
the web, but also about the platform that operates all these 
functions together while the users are delighted to achieve 
more functionalities. 
One can urge that the platforms that Nokia developed and 
employed to power its smartphones since 2007 have achieved 
all these tasks together, but Nokia still failed. That is a true 
argument, however, all these platforms lacked the integration 
into the eco-system that Apple’s iOS and Google’s Android 
have had. In other words, it was not about the product 
(hardware) and platforms (software) alone, but it was about the 
eco-system that supported both. In fact, some viewed the battle 
between platforms became a battle between eco-systems. 
Importantly, although Nokia strategies to innovate, develop, 
and release so many models each year was considered a 
success as Nokia was keen to meet the needs and wants of 
different segments of its customers however, this was 
considered as a lack of the focus on the one product that can 
attract most of the customers and compete perfectly with the 
rivals’ products.  
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APPENDIX A 
TABLE 1 - NOKIA PRODUCT SERIES BASED ON GSMERENA.COM AND WIKIPEDIA.COM  (1996-2017) – ADOPTED FROM [36] 
Nokia Series Year(s) Descriptions 
Nokia 1xxx 1996–2010 Most affordable phones. Mostly targeted towards developing countries and users needing only calls and 
SMS, alarm clock, and reminders.  
Nokia 2xxx 1994–2010 Entry-level phones. More advanced features than the 1000 series, newer models with color screens and 
some feature cameras, Bluetooth and even A-GPS. 
Nokia 3xxx 1997–2009, 2017 Mostly mid-range phones. Later targeted towards the youth market.  
Nokia 5xxx 1998–2010 Similar in features to the 3000 series. Often more features towards active individuals, extra features for 
music playback.  
Nokia 6xxx 1997–2010 Mid-range to high-end phones. High number of features, conservative, unisex designs, business use.  
Nokia 7xxx 1999–2010 Targeted towards fashion-conscious users, especially women; consumer-oriented; fancy design, test 
features. 
Nokia 8xxx 1996–2007 Ergonomics and attractiveness; exclusive, high-end materials.   
Nokia 9xxx 1996–2007 Communicators prior E90 (the latest Communicator) 
C-series 2010–2011 Affordable series optimized for social networking and sharing; OS Series 40 and C-5xx Symbian 60 5th 
ed., C-6/7 Symbian^3.  
E-series 2006–2011 Enterprise-class, business-use; Symbian S60 and E7 Symbian^3.   
N-series 2005–2011 Highly advanced smartphones, with strong multimedia and connectivity features; mainly S60 3rd, but 
Maemo in N900, MeeGo in N950, N8 Symbia^3.  
X-series 2009–2011 Targeted to a young audience with a focus on music and entertainment; OS mainly Series 40, but X5 
(updated) and X6 with S60 and X7-00 with Symbian^3. 
3-digit series 2011–2012 Since the Nokia 500, Nokia has changed the naming rule for Symbian^3 phones. 





Smartphones running Windows Phone. It also includes the Nokia Lumia 2520, a Windows RT-
powered tablet computer. The series was sold to Microsoft in 2014 who branded these products under the 
name Microsoft. 
X Family 2014 A range of Android smartphones from Nokia. These were the first ever Nokia phones to run on Google's 
Android OS. 





Those phones are entry-level, classic mobile phones platform (with long work on battery). The series was 
sold in 2014 to Microsoft which continued branding these products under Nokia. Microsoft sold this series 









             TABLE 2 - NOKIA 5 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS - SOURCE [92]  
 
Figure 14 - Nokia 5 - Source [92] 
 
             TABLE 3 - NOKIA 3 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS - SOURCE [93]  
 
Figure 15 - Nokia 3 - Source [93] 
Nokia 5 - Technical Description   
Launch 
 
Announced: February 2017 
Status: Released June, 2017 
Body 
 
Dimensions: 149.7 x 72.5 x 8 mm 




Type: IPS LCD capacitive touchscreen, 
16M colors 
Size: 5.2 inches 
Platform OS Android 7.1.1 (Nougat) 
Memory Card slot: microSD, up to 256 GB 
Internal: 16 GB, 2 GB RAM 
Camera 13 MP, f/2.0 
Features 
 
Fingerprint, accelerometer, gyro, 
proximity, compass 
Battery Non-removable Li-Ion 3000 mAh battery 
Colors 
 
Tempered Blue, Silver, Matte Black, 
Copper 
Nokia 3 - Technical Description   
Launch 
 
Announced: February 2017 
Status: Released June, 2017 
Body 
 
Dimensions: 143.4 x 71.4 x 8.5 mm 
SIM: Single SIM or Dual SIM 
Display 
 
Type: IPS LCD capacitive touchscreen, 
16M colors 
Size: 5.0 inches 
Platform OS Android 7.1.1 (Nougat) 
Memory Card slot: microSD, up to 256 GB 
Internal: 16 GB, 2 GB RAM 
Camera 8 MP, f/2.0 
Features 
 
Accelerometer, gyro, proximity, compass 
Battery Non-removable Li-Ion 2650 mAh battery 
Colors 
 
Silver White, Matte Black, Blue, Copper 
